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ABSTRACT
A growing body of evidence indicates that excessive sugar
consumption is driving epidemics of obesity and related non-
communicable diseases (NCDs) around the world. South Africa
(SA), a major consumer of sugar, is also the third most obese
country in Africa, and 40% of all deaths in the country result from
NCDs. A number of fiscal, regulatory, and legislative levers could
reduce sugar consumption in SA. This paper focuses on a sugar-
sweetened beverage (SSB) tax. The purpose of the paper is to
highlight the challenges that government might anticipate.
Policies cannot be enacted in a vacuum and discussion is focused
on the industrial, economic, and societal context. The affected
industry actors have been part of the SA economy for over a
century and remain influential. To deflect attention, the sugar
industry can be expected either to advocate for self-regulation or
to promote public–private partnerships. This paper cautions
against both approaches as evidence suggests that they will be
ineffective in curbing the negative health impacts caused by
excessive sugar consumption. In summary, policy needs to be
introduced with a political strategy sensitive to the various
interests at stake. In particular, the sugar industry can be expected
to be resistant to the introduction of any type of tax on SSBs.
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Sugar: a chronic toxin
Excessive sugar consumption is a serious public health concern worldwide and has led in
recent decades to a sharp increase in obesity and associated non-communicable diseases
(NCDs) such as diabetes (Malik et al., 2010), cardiovascular disease (Yang et al., 2014),
cancer (Chocarro-Calvo, García-Martínez, Ardila-González, De la Vieja, & García-
Jiménez, 2013), and dental caries (Touger-Decker & Van Loveren, 2003). In 2013, 42%
of women and 13.5% of men over 20 years of age had a Body Mass Index greater than
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or equal to 30 kg/m², making South Africa (SA) the third most obese nation on the African
continent (Murray et al., 2013) (Figure 1) and 17th in the world (http://www.who.int/gho/
ncd/risk_factors/overweight/en/). The obesity epidemic poses an especially serious
threat in SA, a setting in which the HIV-positive adult population is simultaneously set
to grow.
A 2013 study estimates that, in SA, the annual incidence of amputations from diabetes
is approximately 2000 and of blindness is 8000 (Bertram, Jaswal, Pillay VanWyk, Levitt, &
Hofman, 2013). NCDs in general account for 40% of all deaths in the country (South
African National Department of Health [NDoH], 2013, p. 18). Sixty per cent of 6-year-
olds have tooth decay and only 2% of 44-year-olds have healthy gums (NDoH, 2013).
In SA, one of the most unequal societies in the world, the poor in particular cannot
afford quality health care and die prematurely from NCDs. As a result of conditions
such as diabetes and stroke, a ‘poverty spiral’ is created in which poor health and disability
lead to a labour force with diminished capacity. This in turn leads to slower economic
growth, which exacerbates the original problems of poverty and inequality.
SA ranks number eight worldwide for sugar consumption (Koo & Taylor, 2011). ‘Free’
sugars refer to ‘monosaccharides and disaccharides added to foods by the manufacturer,
cook or consumer, and sugars naturally present in honey, syrups, fruit juices and fruit con-
centrates’ (World Health Organisation [WHO], 2014a, p. 3). In SA, ‘sugar’ typically refers
to white granular sucrose, which is refined from sugarcane sap. The average South African
consumed 36.4 kg of sugar in 2012–2013 (South African Sugar Association [SASA], 2013).
Overconsumption of sugar among children is especially concerning. The recommended
limit for prepubescent children is 15 g per day (Johnson et al., 2009, p. 1013; WHO,
2014a),1 but sugar intake among six to nine-year-olds in 1999 ranged from 22 g per
day in the Eastern Cape to 57 g per day in the Western Cape. Countrywide, the average
Figure 1. Prevalence of obesity in Sub Saharan Africa.
Source: World Health Organisation (WHO) (2011).




























intake in urban areas was 42 g and in rural areas 26 g. White children consumed signifi-
cantly more sugar than black children: 67 g and 47 g, respectively (Steyn & Temple, 2012)
(Figure 2).
Feasibility of fiscal and legal regulation in SA
Current evidence suggests that a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) would be par-
ticularly effective in reducing obesity and associated NCDs. This is because (1) liquid sugar
calories are especially harmful – drinking just one SSB per day increases an adult’s like-
lihood of being overweight by 27% and a child’s by 55% (Morenga, Mallard, & Mann,
2013); (2) SSBs are less satiating than solid sources of sugar, leading to the greater likeli-
hood that they will be consumed in excess; (3) they contain little else apart from sugar,
artificial chemicals, and water; (4) they account for around one-third of all sugar con-
sumed by the average South African;2 (5) such a tax has already been implemented
with varying amounts of success in other lower and middle-income countries (LMICs)
with epidemics of obesity and related NCDs; and (6) it would send a clear message to
the public and raise awareness about sugar, which is necessary in an environment
where marketing and other industry practices are confusing the public and undermining
the ability of consumers to make healthy choices. According to its Strategic plan for the
prevention and control of non-communicable diseases 2013–17, the NDoH considers a tax
on unhealthy foods – specifically those ‘high in fats and sugar’ – to be ‘very’ cost-effective
(2013, pp. 30–31). New research has found that a 20% tax on SSBs in SA would reduce
obesity by 3.8% inmen and 2.4% inwomen in one year, resulting in a reduction of the absol-
ute number of obese people by 220,000 over that same period.3
None of this is to suggest that an SSB tax alone will be sufficient; it should rather be seen
as one of a raft of measures that might be taken to limit the public’s consumption of sugar.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the fact that none of these will be applied within a
societal vacuum. Significant resistance can be expected from related industry sectors,
chiefly sugar and soft drinks. These countervailing pressures need to be understood
before government can embark strategically upon any policy involving sugar regulation.
Figure 2. Consumption of sugar by children aged six to nine years in South Africa – 1999 National Food
Consumption Survey.
Source: Steyn and Temple (2012).





























This paper is a narrative review of potential challenges surrounding the regulation of sugar
in SA. The issues reviewed are as follows. (1) Evidence regarding the link between sugar
and NCDs both globally and in SA. (2) Evidence for the effectiveness of an SSB tax, as well
as for alternatives to government regulation (voluntary industry self-regulation and
public–private partnerships). PubMed was used to search for and select key academic
articles relevant to (1) and (2). (3) Challenges involved in adopting such a tax in SA. In
considering these, the paper adopts a whole-of-society approach, following Walt and
Gilson’s (1994) ‘policy triangle’ (Figure 3) of stakeholders (p. 354). The challenges are con-
sidered in light of the nature of the intervention itself (content), the societal and historical
context in which these occur, as well as aspects of the process of implementing them. The
actors discussed include government, industry, the media, and the consumer public, and
each of these is considered, where possible, at the level of individuals as well as at a col-
lective level (as members of groups). The term sugar industry is used flexibly in the follow-
ing text and refers to the collectivity of actors in the production, manufacture, and
distribution of sugar (either as a product per se or in other products). There is a particular
emphasis on sugar producers. In order to inform (3), academic articles, books, and online
publications in the social, environmental, and geographical sciences, as well as media, gov-
ernment, and market reports (either online or in print) were selected according to their
relevance to the questions raised. Given that the paper is concerned chiefly with (3), it
may be useful to policy-makers (especially in SA, but also elsewhere) in the initial two
stages of developing policy, ‘agenda setting’, and ‘formulation’, according to the four-
stage heuristic first proposed by Lasswell (1956) and subsequently developed further by
others (Brewer & deLeon, 1983; Walt et al., 2008).
Comparisons with the regulation of alcohol, tobacco, and salt
The regulation of widely consumed, harmful substances other than sugar is far from
unprecedented. In SA, alcohol and tobacco have already been regulated for some time
in a variety of ways. So-called ‘sin taxes’ have been placed on alcohol and tobacco for
decades and are considered by government to be a ‘best buy’ (i.e. highly cost-effective,
deterring consumption of these products as well as raising tax revenue). There have
also been restrictions on the advertisement of both, especially tobacco. All tobacco pro-
ducts and alcoholic beverages now contain labels warning the consumer of the health
Figure 3. Policy triangle.
Source: Walt and Gilson (1994).




























risks involved in their consumption. Liquor stores have traditionally been closed on
Sundays and recently, in the Western Cape, legislation has been introduced restricting
the availability of alcohol during the week (Western Cape Liquor Act, 4 of 2008, as
amended by the Western Cape Liquor Amendment Act, 10 of 2010).
More recently, the South African government created new regulations to limit the
amount of salt – which is linked to hypertension – in certain staples, such as bread,
cereals, butter, and processed meats (SA Government Gazette, 2012, pp. 6–7). Over a
period of three years, from 2016 to 2019, manufacturers of these and other foods are
expected to comply with progressively lower limits on their sodium content (Hofman &
Lee, 2013, pp. 6–7). Although it is too soon to appraise such a policy in full, mathematical
modelling shows that reducing the sodium content of bread from 650 to 350 mg per 100 g
would prevent 8% of strokes, 6.5% of ischaemic heart disease, and 11% of hypertensive
heart disease, which would result in 7400 fewer deaths from cardiovascular disease, includ-
ing 4300 fewer non-fatal strokes per year. The savings from hospitalisation alone would be
ZAR350 million per year (Hofman & Lee, 2013, p. 6).
Unlike alcohol and tobacco, salt does not cause harm directly to others. The harm is self-
inflicted, assuming at least, that consumers are informed about the health risks of high
sodium intake and have no dependents. Nevertheless, this harm is very serious from a
public health perspective. In these respects, salt is more like sugar. In the case of sugar,
however, no regulatory action has yet occurred, with the exception of some self-regulatory
measures adopted by industry. These include a pledge by the soft drink industry that it will
not market its products to children under 12 years of age (Consumer Goods Council of SA,
2009, p. 5), but the reality is that children remain exposed to soft drink advertisements on
television, billboards, and the internet as well as through sports promotion (Hawkes &
Harris, 2011). The products themselves sometimes also contain cartoon images, which
are aimed at children, or increase the appeal of these products for them.
The South African sugar industry
Like the tobacco and alcohol industries, the sugar industry constitutes a significant part of
the economy and has long been embedded in the industrial landscape. The industry began
in the 1850s, and its history is intertwined with the country’s colonial and racist past.
Between 1860 and 1911, approximately 150,000 Indian labourers were imported from
the Indian subcontinent into the British colony of Natal (Dubb, 2013, p. 2) (Figure 4).
As the colony expanded, the industry increasingly relied on Zulu labour (Dubb, 2013,
pp. 2–3). By 1910, the sugar industry was an oligopoly consisting mainly of the same
three producers that continue to dominate the industry today: Illovo, Tongaat-Hulett,
and TSB (Transvaal Sugar Limited) (Lewis, 1990, p. 70) (Figure 5). SA sugar production
continued to increase throughout the first part of the twentieth century and enjoyed a long
boom, especially after the SecondWorldWar (Lewis, 1990, p. 73; Tinley, 1954, pp. 43–44).
From the late 1980s onwards, however, production began to exceed consumption. This
prompted the industry to investigate the possibility of producing ethanol, but this
avenue was abandoned after opposition from the oil industry (‘Oil firms’, 1987, p. 8).
Post-1994, following SA’s regional re-integration, Illovo and Tongaat-Hulett began
expanding into Swaziland, Zambia, and Mozambique, where labour and production
costs were lower. Deregulatory measures adopted by the Department of Trade and




























Industry (DTI) during this period also put the sugar industry’s operations in SA under
some strain (Dubb, 2013, pp. 10–18; Godfrey, Lincoln, Theron, & Tuomi, 2003).
Present state of the sugar industry
In recent years, the industry has lobbied for protectionist measures mostly out of
concern for cheap sugar imports from Brazil and India (Hedley, 2014). In April 2014,
an application by the industry for an increase in the import tariff on sugar was
granted by the DTI. The tariff was raised by 58%, but this increase was not as much
as the 113% that the industry had requested. It was, however, significant enough to
be met with objections from retailers, importers, and the Botswana Ministry of Trade
and Industry, all of which argued that it would lead to price increases and harm down-
stream industries. The International Trade Administration Commission (within the
DTI), however, denied that the proposed tariff increase would have any substantial
effect on the price of sugar in SA, and concluded that it would lead to greater pro-
ductivity and profitability for the local industry (Visser, 2014). Perhaps one of the indus-
try’s most persuasive arguments, from the Commission’s point of view, was that failing
to increase the tariff might mean that ‘jobs could be at risk at black-owned millers and
cane growers’ (Hedley, 2014). The sugar industry is well aware of the high priority
placed by government on Black Economic Empowerment and promotes itself as
‘highly empowered’ (Hedley, 2014). It has also attempted to create a new small-scale
grower class in the former SA homelands (Bantustans), which remain underresourced.
According to an industry representative;
We are not doing this only by ourselves, many stakeholders are on board, including the
Department[s] of Agriculture and Land Reform. The aim of this project is to use the ‘free’
communal land to plant sugarcane for the purpose of providing the country with adequate
sugar for the future. This also creates job opportunities for local people. (Dlamini, 2014)
Figure 4. Indian indentured labourers cutting sugarcane in Natal in the nineteenth century.
Source: The Gandhi-Luthuli Documentation Centre, University of KwaZulu-Natal, SA. http://www.
thehindu.com/opinion/columns/Kalpana_Sharma/the-other-half-at-the-crossroads-of-identity/article900
234.ece




























Under current conditions, however, the industry can scarcely afford to pay small-scale
growers a living wage (Dubb, 2013, pp. 16–17). The benefits of such a project can thus be
expected to accrue mainly to the industry.
The idea of converting surplus sugar into ethanol is also being revisited by the industry
as a long-term strategy to increase its profits. From 1 October 2015, fuel producers will be
required ‘to blend diesel and petrol with biofuels, such as ethanol’ (Prinsloo, 2014). The
industry has said, however, that it will be unable to afford conversion of sugar mills
into ethanol-producing facilities – which would cost some ZAR20 billion – without
government subsidies. Meanwhile, the industry is expanding its operations in other
Southern African countries. One reason for this is tax related. In Zambia, for instance,
one producer has avoided paying some ZAR185 million in tax revenue to the government
(Lewis, 2013). There are also fewer hurdles involved in acquiring land elsewhere in
Southern Africa. In Mozambique, another producer managed to acquire over 30,000 hec-
tares of land, displacing whole communities of subsistence farmers in the process and poi-
soning their water supply (Ferro, 2012). This increasing regional investment will likely be
accelerated by a sugar workers’ strike in SA in 2014, the first such strike since 1997
(Mkhize & Gernetzky, 2014). Five thousand five hundred workers, chiefly represented
by the Food and Allied Workers’ Union demanded an 11% wage increase, a 40-hour
working week, and a housing allowance of ZAR800 per month (‘Sugar strike ends’,
2014). If further strikes occur, this could put industry under significant additional
financial strain.
Consumption trends in SA
Rising average incomes, coupled with the ubiquity of high-sugar ultra-processed foods,4
has led to a rapid increase in sugar consumption in SA during the latter part of
the twentieth century. An example of this is the remarkable 10-fold increase in sugar
consumption by the rural Zulu population – who inhabit SA’s sugar cane-growing
Figure 5. Major sugar producers in South Africa (by market share).
Source: National Department of Agriculture, Republic of South Africa (2006).




























region – from under 3 kg of sugar per year in 1953 to nearly 30 kg in 1964 (Yudkin, 1986,
p. 39). A 1981 study showed that black urban South African teenagers aged 16–18 con-
sumed 45%–71% more sugar than their rural counterparts (Walker et al., 1981).
Another study from 1975 revealed that white South African 16–17-year-old teenagers
were consuming about 49 kg of sugar per year (Walker, 1975). In the late 1950s, one-
fifth of all the sugar consumed in SA was found in ultra-processed foods such as confec-
tionary, ice creams, soft drinks, cakes, and biscuits (Yudkin, 1986, p. 47). In 2012, soft
drinks alone constituted about one-third of sugar in the South African diet. Coca-Cola
has a monopoly over soft drinks in SA with approximately 60% of the market
share, while 30 smaller companies account for the remaining 40% (Euromonitor
International, 2013).
In recent years, as mentioned, the increase in sugar consumption has slowed, but con-
sumption remains high. According to SASA (2013), the average amount consumed per
person per day – 23.5 teaspoons, or about 99 g – is four times that of the new WHO
recommendations (Figure 6).5 In March 2014, the WHO revised its recommended
limit of sugar to 5% of daily calories (World Health Organisation, 2014a, p. 3), approxi-
mately equivalent to six teaspoons, or about 25 g. This means that consuming a single
330 ml soft drink (which contains seven to eight teaspoons of sugar) per day should
be considered excessive. From a dental health point of view, the recommended limit is
even lower at 2–3% (Scheiham & James, 2014). Meanwhile, soft drink sales in SA
are projected to increase by nearly 13% between 2012 and 2017 (Euromonitor
International, 2013).
Figure 6. South African sugar supplies into the South African customs union market.
Source: South African Sugar Association (2013). http://www.sasa.org.za/Files/SA%20sugar%20supplies
%20into%20SACU%20market%202013.pdf.




























Industry response to SSB taxes
Industry response worldwide
In those countries that have recently imposed a tax on SSBs, industry response has varied. In
Mexico, for instance, ‘bottlers and food companies… launched an aggressive media cam-
paign against the tax’, proposed by their president in 2013 (Estevez, 2013). President Peña
Nieto intended the revenue from the tax, approximately 15 billion pesos (ZAR12.2
billion), to be ‘earmarked for drinking water in schools – in some communities there is
none, while in others it is not potable and bottled soft drinks are safer’ (Boseley, 2014). In
response, full-page advertisements in Mexican newspapers proclaimed, ‘You don’t fight
obesity with taxes’ (Estevez, 2013). The proposed tax was blamed on ‘foreign influences’,
such as the wealthy former New York Mayor Bloomberg (Estevez, 2013). The pretext for
this was that Consumer Power, a Mexican NGO that lobbied for the SSB tax, receives
funds from Bloomberg Philanthropies. Mexico’s largest TV network refused to air pro-tax
advertisements (Estevez, 2013). After the SSB taxwas imposed in the face of this fierce oppo-
sition, one Mexican bottler responded by announcing that it may have to switch from cane
sugar to the cheaper alternative of high fructose corn syrup (Flannery, 2013).
In the USA, SSB taxes and similar measures such as New York Mayor Bloomberg’s pro-
posed ban on soft drinks of more than 16 fluid ounces (or 473 ml) have consistently been
opposed by industry. One exception to this was industry cooperation on a soft drinks ban
in schools (Burros & Warner, 2006). In 2009, there were SSB taxes in 33 US states, but
public health researchers argued that at a mean rate of 5.2%, these were too low to have
any deterrent effect (Brownell et al., 2009). In opposition to existing SSB taxes as well
as to any increase or further spread of these, a group called Americans Against Food
Taxes was set up in 2009 with financial support from a number of large food and beverage
companies (‘Tax Soft Drinks’, 2009). Although such lobbying has generally been unsuc-
cessful, one of its main victories was a legal one against Mayor Bloomberg’s proposed
ban. In June 2014, the New York State Court of Appeals upheld two lower court judge-
ments declaring the ban unconstitutional on the basis that it violated separation of
powers (Ax, 2013; Grynbaum, 2014).
In Europe, industry has been less hostile. When France’s SSB tax came into effect in
2012, industry announced that it would compensate for the tax by increasing soft drink
prices by as much as 35%. Assuming negative price elasticity, this would deter consumers
to an even greater extent from consuming too many SSBs. Coca-Cola, however,
announced that it would suspend a €17 million (ZAR257 million) investment near
Marseille in ‘a symbolic protest against a tax that punishes our company and stigmatizes
our products’ (‘French “Cola Tax”’, 2011). Food manufacturers in Hungary have
responded to that country’s tax by complaining that ‘the government should at least
consult them before introducing a tax that will likely heavily impact the future of Hungar-
ian food processing, which is already facing hardships due to the economic crisis’ (Gulyas,
2011). Denmark, meanwhile, which had maintained a soft drink tax since the 1930s, abol-
ished it at the start of 2014 as part of a government strategy ‘to create jobs and boost the
economy’ (Scott-Thomas, 2013). Danish excise duties remain, however, on other products
high in sugar such as confectionery and ice cream (Scott-Thomas, 2013).
One industry-funded study showed that a US 10 cent tax on a 12 ounce (355 ml) SSB
would lead to a loss of 210,000 jobs in the American beverage industry and 150,000 jobs in




























related industries (Hahn, 2009). An independent study has shown, however, that a 20%
SSB tax would actually result in small increases in overall employment (Powell, Wada,
Persky, & Chaloupka, 2014). This is because the money not spent on soft drinks would
be spent elsewhere by consumers. There would also be an increase in government jobs,
as people would need to be employed in order to enforce the tax. When these factors
were taken into account, there was a net increase in employment in both Illinois
(0.06%) and California (0.03%). This latter study concluded that ‘SSB taxes do not have
a negative impact on state-level employment’ and went on to warn that ‘industry claims
of regional job losses are overstated and may mislead lawmakers and constituents’
(Powell et al., 2014, pp. 675–676).
Industry also continues to dispute, just as the tobacco industry did for decades, the very
harmfulness of its products. It has funded many of its own studies, which show no associ-
ation between sugar consumption and overweight or obesity. A recent meta-analysis,
however, casts doubt on these studies. While five out of six studies funded by industry
found no association between sugar consumption and weight gain, the exact same pro-
portion of independently funded studies found a clear one (Bes-Rastrollo, Shulze,
Ruiz-Canela, & Martinez-Gonzales, 2013).
Self-regulation
To the extent that industry acknowledges the problem of excessive sugar consumption, it
usually proposes self-regulation as the most appropriate solution (Chan, 2013). Reliable
evidence for the effectiveness of self-regulation is limited. One independent study,
however, has evaluated a voluntary (US) industry pledge to sell 1 trillion fewer calories
by 2012 and 1.5 trillion fewer calories by 2015 (from a 2007 baseline) (Ng, Slining, &
Popkin, 2014, pp. 508–519). The authors conclude that industry succeeded in meeting
– and even exceeding – the 2012 target, but go on to note several important caveats
(Ng, Slining, & Popkin, 2014, p. 508). The evaluation only concerned the Consumer
Product Goods sector and therefore did not take into account fast food (Ng, Slining, &
Popkin, 2014, pp. 516–517):
Moreover, because the… pledge only refers to changes in calories sold, this evaluation does
not look at other measures of nutritional concern. Changes in intakes of solid fats, added
sugars, refined carbohydrates, and sodium were not specifically examined, but their levels
are still too high in the U.S. (Ng, Slining, & Popkin, 2014, p. 517)
A crucial question, therefore, is whether the current calorie reduction trajectories can be
sustained in the future. The authors express some doubt over this (Ng, Slining, & Popkin,
2014, p. 516). They also leave room for optimism, however. Recent research shows that
‘industry efforts to reduce excess calories sold through product reformulation, changes
in portion size, and marketing do not need to be at odds with profits and may actually
lead to improved corporate bottom lines’ (Ng, Slining, & Popkin, 2014, p. 517).
Public–private partnerships
In September 2011, just two days after the United Nations General Assembly concluded a
conference on the prevention and control of NCDs (http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/
65/issues/ncdiseases.shtml), UN Women – an organisation formed in July 2010 –




























announced a public–private partnership with The Coca-Cola Company ‘to promote
women’s economic empowerment’ (UN Women, 2011). The partnership aims to
achieve this goal ‘by building upon the strengths of both organizations’ (UN Women,
2011). In SA, it would involve providing business training, mentoring and capital to ‘a
total of 25,000 women entrepreneurs, many of whom are running small retail businesses
[e.g. so-called “spaza shops”] within the Coca-Cola value chain’ (UN Women, 2014).
From industry’s point of view, there are few if any disadvantages to such a partnership,
through which it can improve its public relations. The Director for Gender and Women
Empowerment at the SA DTI, for instance, has said that she was ‘encouraged’ by this
‘display of corporate citizenry’ (Maqutu, 2014). The juxtaposition of the UN imprimatur
and Coca-Cola logo is a huge asset for the company in terms of promoting its brand, par-
ticularly in remote rural areas. These strategies, which are ultimately good for industry’s
‘bottom line’, have been described as ‘corporate capture’, that is, the capture by corpor-
ations of the public sector (Mindell, Reynolds, Cohen, & McKee, 2012).
Such a partnership thus raises some serious questions from the perspective of UN
Women. According to its official website, ‘Several international agreements guide the
work of UN Women’ (http://www.unwomen.org/en/about-us/guiding-documents).
These include the Millennium Declaration and Millennium Development Goals, which
are summarised on UN Women’s website as ‘a set of time-bound and measurable goals
and targets to promote gender equality and to combat poverty, hunger, disease [empha-
sised here], illiteracy and environmental degradation by 2015’ (http://www.unwomen.
org/en/about-us/guiding-documents). While these goals ought not to be pursued in
such a way that they conflict with one another, it is inevitable that partnerships with
SSB companies could result in the achievement of some only at the expense of others.
On the one hand, the economic empowerment of women, especially in LMICs, will con-
tribute towards greater gender equality and the alleviation of poverty. On the other hand,
the more successful these women-led businesses are, the more SSBs will be sold and the
worse the obesity epidemic – which affects women especially badly – will become. More-
over, the growth of SSB industries in SA will probably result in greater environmental dev-
astation. Sugar production is both water- and land-intensive, and leads to a large amounts
of (especially water) pollution, affecting downstream producers (Fig, 2007, p. 174).
A 2013 study cautions governments against ‘public–private partnerships’, which are at
best an attempt to delay government regulation of industry and at worst ‘a means for
industry to co-opt public health’ (Moodie et al., 2013, p. 675). The authors conclude
that ‘there is no evidence that the partnerships with… ultra-processed food and drink
industries are safe or effective, unless driven by the threat of government regulation…
Regulation or the threat… [thereof], is the only way to change transnational corporations’
(Moodie et al., 2013, pp. 676–677). The UN itself seems to have arrived at the same con-
clusion. In 2014, the UN Human Rights Council published a report specifically addressing
the issues of ‘unhealthy foods, NCDs and the right to health’, which also treats the idea of
public–private partnerships with scepticism:
Collaboration between Governments and food corporations has been recommended as an
alternative to self-regulation. One of the major reasons cited… is that food corporations
have the ability to promote healthier dietary habits and are therefore a part of the sol-
ution to reduce and prevent the obesity epidemic. However, the conflict of interest
between the State’s duty to promote public health and companies’ responsibility




























towards their shareholders to increase profits renders private – public partnership suspect.
(2014, p. 10)
The WHO, for its part, ‘does not engage with industries making products that directly
harm human health, including specifically the tobacco and arms industries’ (2014b,
p. 3). Since a single 330 ml soft drink exceeds the WHO’s recommended limit for
sugar, this might reasonably be interpreted to include the SSB industry.
Addressing the challenges of the sugar industry
At its worst, industry has actively sought to frustrate the public health goals of government
organisations. In 2003, when the WHO recommended that sugar should account for 10%
or less of daily calories, the US sugar industry attempted to intimidate the organisation by
threatening to withdraw its funding ($406 million) unless it raised this to 25% of daily
calories (Boseley, 2003, pp. 831–832). Although the attempt was unsuccessful, this
episode serves to illustrate the lengths to which industry may go in opposing any
moves that it perceives as being against its interests.
The experiences globally show that industry resistance can be overcome, even in the
USA, with its large industry-funded lobby groups and much stronger free market tra-
dition. In a country with a high unemployment rate, however, policy advisors will be
expected to make a strong case that there will be no net job losses, at least not in the
long term. Perhaps by employing similar modelling techniques to those used by Powell
et al. (2014) in the USA, this could be shown convincingly for SA. An even more broad-
minded policy might look into the possibility of gradual long-term crop substitution. This
would ensure not only that those employed by the sugar industry have the option of
remaining in the agricultural sector, but also that sugar is replaced with nutritious alterna-
tives. KwaZulu-Natal, where most of SA’s sugarcane is currently grown, has an ideal
climate for maize, round beans, jugo beans, cowpeas, sesame seeds, and ground nuts in
the summer, and onions, spinach, beetroot, peppers, lettuce, tomatoes, cabbages, pump-
kins, and butternut in the winter. Many of these crops were traditionally grown in the
region before the advent of sugar; for this reason, their cultivation would also be less
water-intensive and less environmentally destructive (Personal communication with
Lawrence Mkaliphi of Biowatch, an SA sustainability NGO, 2014).
The sugar industry in SA can be expected to offer significant resistance to a tax that
might weaken it any further. According to SASA’s official website, ‘sugar is not the new
tobacco’ and ‘myths about sugar’ include: ‘sugar makes you gain weight’, ‘sugar is addic-
tive’, ‘sugar gives you diabetes’, and ‘sugar rots your teeth’ (http://www.sasa.org.za/
SugarandHealth/Mythsaboutsugar.aspx). This information either distorts or contradicts
current scientific evidence and serves to confuse the public.
Media response and public opinion
South African media response to the proposed SSB tax
The SA media have been broadly sympathetic to the idea of a sugar tax or other forms of
regulation such as warning labels similar to those currently found on tobacco products
(Ashton, 2014; Holmes, 2013; ‘Protecting a poison’, 2014). Some in the media, however,




























have voiced concerns about the emergence of a ‘nanny state’. One striking example of this
is an article by a representative of the South African Free Market Foundation:
Taxing sugar and other ‘sinful products’ is a blunt instrument that, besides treating adults like
children, diverts attention from the government’s insatiable appetite to control people’s lives
and to raise revenue by any means possible.
The unhealthy appetite belongs not to those consumers of sugar, but the taxer. If you are an
individual concerned about your health, take charge of your own life – don’t shrug off your
personal responsibilities and entrust your health care to a non-existent collective. There is no
such thing as ‘public health’. (Nolutshungu, 2014)
The extent to which such libertarian arguments enjoy support in SA is unclear, but they
ought to be addressed. The provocative statement that there is ‘no such thing as “public
health”’ is especially troubling (Nolutshungu, 2014). The main drivers of sugar consump-
tion are not individual, but environmental. Individuals overconsume due to (physical,
social, political, economic, and legal) macro-level factors beyond their control, which
determine the price, availability, promotion, and marketing of high-sugar products.
When one considers all this, as well as the fact that the sugar industry is likely behind
these drivers, it becomes clear that governments have a duty to act and to protect
people by creating an environment in which consumers can make healthier choices free
of constant and overwhelming pressures to consume sugar. It should also be pointed
out ‘nanny state’ arguments rely heavily on an artificial ‘slippery slope’ from regulation
of potentially harmful substances – such as tobacco, alcohol, salt and sugar – to regulation
of all our personal choices.
The importance of the media
The media has the potential to relay independent and reliable information to the public
about the negative health consequences of consuming too much sugar. Some individuals
would undoubtedly continue to overconsume whether or not they have access to this
information. However, as was the case with tobacco, accurate media portrayal of the situ-
ation may lead over time to a shift in public attitudes and changes in the general diet.
Public opinion regarding an SSB tax
It is unclear how many South Africans would favour an SSB tax, but an opinion poll con-
ducted in Mexico, another large LMIC, is instructive. When polled simply on whether or
not they would support an SSB tax, under half of respondents replied in the affirmative,
but this increased to 70% when they were told that the tax revenue would be used to
fund obesity prevention programmes and the provision of clean water in schools
(Bittman, 2013). Even in the USA, where one might expect to encounter greater suspicion
among the public towards any new taxes, majorities in northern as well as southern states
agreed with the idea of an SSB tax, provided that the revenue would go towards obesity
prevention programmes, oral health programmes, and healthcare programmes for lower
and middle-income children. A lesson that may be drawn from these examples is that
SSB taxes ‘are most likely to receive public support when the revenues are designated to
promote the health of key groups, such as children and underserved populations’




























(Friedman & Brownell, 2012, p. 5). This lesson should be applicable to SA as well, although
opinion polls would need to be conducted there in order to confirm this.
Conclusion
Before adopting and implementing an SSB tax, public health experts need to be cognisant
of persisting complex societal obstacles. The main challenge comes from vested interests.
Aggressive marketing and advertising campaigns, including corporate social responsibility
initiatives, ensure that excessive consumption remains the social norm. This is especially
the case in emerging economies such as SA with growing populations that can afford SSBs
and other low-cost, high-sugar foods. Current consumption trends, if allowed to continue
unchecked, will likely lead to unprecedented rates of obesity and related NCDs. In 2014,
the WHO revised its recommended limit of sugar to 5% of daily calories. Many other
countries in the Global South are already taking various steps to bring sugar consumption
more in line with this recommendation. SA ought to leverage this inflection point.
One important task is to ensure greater public awareness of the harmfulness of sugar. In
order to achieve this, the power of the media should be harnessed. Sugar should be por-
trayed as the ‘new tobacco’. A public awareness campaign is unlikely to be sufficient,
however. An SSB tax is another effective policy that should be considered in order to
combat dental caries, obesity and related NCDs. For this to succeed in SA, several chal-
lenges must be anticipated. Strategic solutions to overcome them must then be developed.
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Notes
1. This assumes that prepubescent children will consume between 1200 and 1600 calories in total
per day.
2. This approximate figure has been calculated using SASA data on annual per capita sugar con-
sumption for 2012/2013 (36 kg) and data on soft drink sales (Euromonitor International, 2013).
3. Paper currently under review.
4. This paper follows the definition provided by Moodie et al. (2013): ‘Ultra-processed products
are made from processed substances extracted or refined from whole foods – e.g., oils, hydro-
genated oils and fats, flours and starches, variants of sugar, and cheap parts or remnants of
animal foods – with little or no whole foods’ (p. 671).
5. These figures have been calculated by taking the annual per capita sugar consumption for 2012/
2013 (36 kg) dividing this by 365, the number of days in the year and then multiplying by 1000
to arrive at an amount in grams. In order to calculate the number of teaspoons, this figure was
further divided by 4.2. Figures have been rounded off.
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